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Independent auditing and investor law protection are regarded as two important 
institutions to regulate financial reporting fraud and protect the interests of investors. 
Due to the high regulation in Chinese Security Market and dominant administrative 
penalty of CPA Liability, it is vital for the efficiency of administrative penalty on 
financial reporting fraud, and also gives researchers new perspective to exmine the 
relationship between independent auditing and investor law protection. 
Based on classifing the financial reporting fraud literatures, we find that there 
lacks systematic researches on the relationship between administrative penalty on 
financial reporting fraud and independent auditing, and also are puzzled by some 
conclusions. On the background of high monopoly status of provincial auditing 
market in China and effeciency of CPA administrative penalty, the dissertation uses 
empirical method and samples normally traded A share listed companies between 
2001 and 2008, which do not belong to financial industry and do not issue foreign 
share, to investigate effects of administrative penalty on financial reporting fraud on 
auditing quality in perspectives of audit pricing, audit opinion and ERC. 
Empirical results illustrate that: (1) government officers incentive mechanism, 
characterd as political tournament, is the institutional factor of highly monopolistic 
provincial auditing market in China, which in turn impairs the auditing quality; (2) 
due to the effect of reputation mechanism, CPA administrative penalty improves the 
auditing quality to a certain degree; (3) auditors price the administrative penalty on 
financial reporting fraud, and pricing effect is significantly affected by bargaining 
power, the nature and degree of financial reporting fraud, and scale effect, which 
becomes insignificant when auditors face administrative penalty; (4) administrative 
penalty on financial reporting fraud significantly increases the possibility of issuing 
modified opinion, decreases opinion shopping and opinion improvement by auditor 
switching, profitability increasing and liability level decreasing, but opinion 














administrative penalty; (5) the improvement of auditing quality by the administrative 
penalty on financial reporting fraud is significantly affected by auditor 
characteristics, such as auditor administrative penalty, monopoly auditors and 
long-term auditing tenure, meanwhile is not significantly affected by internal 
corporate governance and provincial environments; (6) due to risk-averse and 
reputation mechanism, investors make significantly positive reactions to the 
improvement of auditing quality by financial reporting fraud adminsitrative penalty 
when auditors issuing modified opinion, or not existing opinion improvement, and 
auditors facing adminsitrative penalty. 
The main possible contributions of the dissertation are as follows: (1) it 
explicitly illustrates the highly monopolistic provincial auditing market in China, its 
insititutional factor, and its impairment on auditing quality, which guide the 
following audit market research; (2) empirical results demonstrate that auditor 
adminsitrative penalty improves the auditing quality, and investors recognize such 
effect, which expands new perspective of CPA liablity research; (3) it systematically 
investigates the effects of the administrative penalty on financial reporting fraud on 
audit pricing, audit opinion and ERC, discusses whether such effect is affected by 
institutions and enviroments, and demostrates that financial reporting fraud 
administrative penalty really improves the auditing quality. 
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治理制度安排。图 1－1 和图 1－2 显示，2001－2008 年间遭受监管部门行政处
罚的财务报告舞弊公司家数和比例分别在 44 家－68 家、2.93％－5.00％之间波
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图 1－2  2001－2008 年间监管部门和审计师对财务报告舞弊的监督力度 2 
 
监管部门和审计师对财务报告舞弊持续稳定监督的回报也是相当丰厚的。图
1－3 和图 1－4 显示，2001－2008 年间发生财务报告舞弊、实质性财务报告舞弊
（即存在虚构利润、虚构资产或虚假陈述三种财务报告舞弊）和非实质性财务报
告舞弊的公司家数分别从 124 家、51 家和 73 家显著降低到 50 家、13 家和 37 家，
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